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THE ANALYTIC APOSTERIORI AND A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS THAT IS EXHIBITED IN THE LIVED 
EXPERIENCES OF THOSE SEEKING TO MARRY SOMEONE OF 
THE SAME SEX 
VINCENT J. SAMAR* 
The purpose of this essay is to suggest a new direction in our thinking 
about substantive due process that recognizes human rights in the lived 
experience of our fellow human beings.  The applicability of the approach, at 
least for equal protection purposes, was hinted at by the Supreme Court’s 
majority opinion in Romer v. Evans, but it has never been given full 
consideration.1  There, Justice Kennedy noted the very real impact of a state 
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Professor Victoria S. Wike of Loyola University Chicago, Philosophy Department for her critical 
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Chicago, Criminal Justice Department for his careful check of the grammar, and Philosophy 
Professor Daniel Kynaston, of Oakton Community College for his support of the 
phenomenological viewpoint expressed.  This article is dedicated to all those who have remained 
steadfast in the fight for same-sex marriage equality. 
 1. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).  Romer involved a constitutional 
challenge to Amendment 2 to the Colorado constitution that “prohibits all legislative, executive or 
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect . . . homosexual 
persons or gays and lesbians.”  Id.  In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy hinted at an approach 
that takes the meaning of precepts from our lived experience when he relied on “the authoritative 
construction of Colorado’s Supreme Court” as to what the amendment does.  Id. at 626.  
According to the Colorado Supreme Court: 
The immediate objective of Amendment 2 is, at minimum, to repeal existing statutes, 
regulations, ordinances, and policies of state and local entities that barred discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. . . .  The “ultimate effect” of Amendment 2  is to prohibit any 
governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective statutes, regulations, 
ordinances, or policies in the future unless the state constitution is first amended to permit 
such measures. 
Id. at 626–27 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d. 1270, 1284–85 & n.25 (Colo. 1993) (citations 
omitted).  Justice Kennedy understood this construction to mean: 
Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal status effected by this law.  So much 
is evident from the ordinances that the Colorado Supreme Court declared would be void 
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constitutional amendment prohibiting antidiscrimination legislation against a 
group of people.  What he did not say is how such an amendment might also 
impact the self-impression gays and lesbians have of themselves, although this 
would certainly be part of such an amendment’s impact.  Moreover, legal and 
philosophical research in this area suggests that there may be more here than 
previously thought.  While I do not hope to resolve every philosophical 
question at the heart of my legal analysis, I do intend to bring forth enough 
substance to answer the indeterminacy charge levied by certain Supreme Court 
justices and others concerning which rights should count as “fundamental” 
under substantive due process in part by looking at the impact such rights have 
on individual self-esteem. 
I.  THE PROBLEM 
Substantive due process is the term applied when American courts use the 
due process clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to identify 
unenumerated general rights in the Constitution “that reserve to the individual 
the power to possess or to do certain things, despite the government’s desire to 
 
by operation of Amendment 2.  Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class 
with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres.  
The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection 
from injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and 
policies. 
Id. at 627. 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), similarly 
follows along this same line.  In Lawrence, a Texas statute had made it a crime for members of 
the same sex to engage in “deviate sexual intercourse,” being defined as “any contact between 
any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.”  Id. at 563 (citing 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003)).  In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor 
notes, with respect to the lived experience of persons in the petitioners’ position, that 
[T]he effect of the Texas’ sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of prosecution or 
consequence of conviction.  Texas’ sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals, 
thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as 
everyone else.  Indeed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral effects of 
the law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law “legally sanctions 
discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal 
law” . . . . 
Id. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. 
App. 1992)).  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion also picks up on this theme when he states: 
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial.  The offense, to be sure, 
is but a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense in the Texas legal system.  Still, it remains 
a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.  The 
petitioners will bear on their record the history of their criminal convictions.  Just this 
Term we rejected various challenges to state laws requiring the registration of sex 
offenders. 
Id. at 575 (majority opinion). 
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the contrary.”2  The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”3  The Fourteenth Amendment similarly provides in pertinent part: 
“No state shall make or enforce any law . . . [to] deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”4  In instances where the 
courts determine that due process requires more than compliance with a 
particular procedure, but actual recognition of rights to liberty (including 
sexual liberty) or property, the argument’s basis is substantive rather than 
procedural.  Obvious examples of the former include the right of a parent to 
direct the education of her child,5 the rights of married6 and unmarried7 couples 
to have access to contraception, the right of minors to receive contraceptives,8 
and the right of a woman to choose whether to continue a pregnancy.9  It also 
includes the right of two adults to engage in private consensual same-sex, 
noncommercial, sexual activity in the home.10 
The right to contract under the clause has been substantially diminished 
from its initial beginnings when the Supreme Court first ruled that under the 
contract clause, incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
a state could not limit the number of hours a baker could work.11  That decision 
would eventually be disavowed when the Court subsequently upheld minimum 
wage legislation in the State of Washington.12  This latter change in the 
property area represented a significant retraction from the Court’s earlier 
libertarian view of property rights to a more social welfare construction in 
which the political branches could offset market anomalies to further the public 
welfare.13  But it also raises the question: how resilient are rights recognized 
under the due process clauses from later erosion?  More importantly, it 
 
 2. Substantive Due Process, STANFORD, http://www.stanford.edu/group/psylawseminar/ 
Substantive%20Due%20Process.htm (last visited Jun. 19, 2011). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5. In Meyer v. Nebraska, Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, stated that the 
“liberty” protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “[w]ithout doubt . . . 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, 
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”  262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 7. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 8. Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 11. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 12. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 13. Id. at 391–93. 
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bespeaks the difficulty that some justices have had in determining exactly what 
substantive rights the due process clause encompasses, if any.  If the due 
process clause protects only “fundamental rights,” then the question arises: 
which rights are fundamental?14  Here, one finds the Court in search of a 
method to delineate the importance of various rights.15 
It might be noted that I have not drawn a substantive distinction between 
the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.  This is because the 
distinction is less concerned with which rights are present and more concerned 
with which level of government those rights might be asserted against.  The 
Fifth Amendment restricts the federal government; it was adopted as part of 
the compromise to adopt the Constitution of 1787 to prevent an overarching 
central government from intruding on the individual prerogatives of the states 
and rights of the citizens.16  The Fourteenth Amendment applies against state 
governments; it was adopted after the end of the Civil War and after the 
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, because of, among other things, a 
recommendation of a Joint Committee of Congress that “extensively 
catalogued the abuses of civil rights in the former slave states” and 
recommended that “adequate security for future peace and safety . . . can only 
be found in such changes of the organic law as shall determine the civil rights 
and privileges of all citizens in all parts of the republic.”17 
Since its adoption, the Court has, in a piece meal fashion, “incorporated”18 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights to apply against the states, most 
recently the Second Amendment.19  Interestingly, because the Court has 
sometimes enunciated new unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not previously recognized as applying against the federal 
government under the Fifth Amendment, the Court has also used the Fifth 
 
 14. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Thomas provided that “fundamental” is “a term 
the Court has long struggled to define.”  130 S. Ct. 3020, 3061 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 15. In his majority opinion in McDonald, Justice Alito stated: “The relationship between the 
Bill of Rights’ guarantees and the States must be governed by a single, neutral principle.”  Id. at 
3048.  “[W]e have never held a provision of the Bill of Rights applies to the States only if there is 
a ‘popular consensus’ that the right is fundamental, and we see no basis for such a rule.”  Id. at 
3049.  In this particular case, the majority paid particular note to the Amici who contended “that 
the right [right to keep and bear arms] is especially important for women and members of other 
groups that may be especially vulnerable to violent crime.”  Id. 
 16. Substantive Due Process, supra note 2; see, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 234–37, 278, 290, 291 (1985). 
 17. Substantive Due Process, supra note 2; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3071 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted). 
 18. The “incorporations doctrine” advocated by Justice Black in Gideon v. Wainwright was a 
theory of “selective incorporation” in which the due process clause would be used to incorporate 
particular rights against the states contained in the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights as 
the Court would find them to be “fundamental.”  372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963). 
 19. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
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Amendment in so-called “reverse incorporation” to ensure those rights also 
restricted the federal government, a needed result if the right is to be thought 
truly fundamental.20 
Having identified the Court’s long-standing search for a theory of which 
rights are fundamental, the question we must now ask concerns how to identify 
those rights.  One standard approach is to ask if the right “is fundamental to 
our scheme of ordered liberty, or . . . ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.’”21  Conservative justices, however, criticize some of the Court’s 
recent decisions for adopting “a far less measurable range of criteria” to 
encompass a “liberty of the person both in its special and its more transcendent 
dimensions.”22  The controversy begs the question of whether the Court has 
determined an approach to discover the liberties protected under the due 
process clauses.  Put another way, what is the concept of ordered liberty and 
what is it that is sought when asking whether a claimed right is “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition?” 
In Palko v. Connecticut,23 the defendant claimed that a sentence of death 
for first degree murder, following a retrial after the state appealed his 
conviction for second degree murder, violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by twice putting him in jeopardy of life or limb.24  In 
affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of the State of 
Connecticut, which had affirmed the conviction, Justice Cardozo referenced 
the different provisions of the Bill of Rights.25  He then wrote that a 
 
 20. For example, in Bolling v. Sharpe, a companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court reverse incorporated its desegregation rule to apply to the schools 
of the District of Columbia.  347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 21. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
(1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (“These decisions make it clear 
that only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’ are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”). 
 22. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 562 (2002)). 
 23. Palko, 302 U.S. at 319–22. 
 24. Id. 
 25. At this point, the Bill of Rights had not been firmly deemed fundamental.  The Court 
stated the following: 
The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, that no person shall be held to 
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury.  This court has held that, in prosecutions by a state, presentment or indictment 
by a grand jury may give way to informations at the instance of a public officer.  The 
Fifth Amendment provides also that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself.  This court has said that, in prosecutions by a state, the 
exemption will fail if the state elects to end it.  The Sixth Amendment calls for a jury trial 
in criminal cases and the Seventh for a jury trial in civil cases at common law where the 
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background organizing principle might still be identified from the traditions 
and conscience of the people: 
The line of division may seem to be wavering and broken if there is a hasty 
catalogue of the cases on the one side and the other.  Reflection and analysis 
will induce a different view.  There emerges the perception of a rationalizing 
principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence.  The 
right to trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution except as the result of 
an indictment may have value and importance.  Even so, they are not of the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.  To abolish them is not to violate a 
“principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as 
to be ranked as fundamental.”26 
The passage suggests that Justice Cardozo was of two minds with regard to 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  On the one hand, he 
seems to be suggesting that what is essential to the scheme of ordered liberty is 
how we identify those rights, which the due process clause protects.  On the 
other hand, because he fails to be more specific about how essentiality is 
determined, he inasmuch accepts that many important rights, like the right to 
trial by jury, will not be considered essential.  Still, he was insightful in first 
giving recognition to the fact that such a right would have to be at “the very 
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”  And, second, that to be ranked 
fundamental, such a right must be connected to “a principle of 
justice . . . rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.”27 
The debate that Justice Cardozo joined posited those justices, like himself, 
who believed in “selective incorporation” against those justices, like Black and 
Douglas, who supported “total incorporation.”28  Justice Frankfurter took a 
middle position.  He believed due process prohibits practices that “offend those 
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples.”29  The debate on the Court ranged over three separate 
issues: first, over history and whether the framers of the Fourteenth 
 
value in controversy should exceed $20.  This court has ruled that consistently with those 
amendments trial by jury may be modified by a state or abolished altogether. . . . 
  On the other hand, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it 
unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First 
Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the Congress or the like freedom of the 
press, or the free exercise of religion, or the right of peaceful assembly, without which 
speech would be unduly trampled, or the right of one accused of a crime to the benefit of 
counsel. 
Id. at 323–24 (citations omitted). 
 26. Id. at 325 (citations omitted). 
 27. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Brown 
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936)) (citing Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). 
 28. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Amendment intended for it to apply all the Bill of Rights against the states; 
second, over federalism and whether “[a]pplying the Bill of Rights to the states 
imposes a substantial set of restrictions on state and local governments”; and 
third, over judicial restraint in furtherance of democracy in judging whether 
“selective incorporation gives judges far too much discretion in deciding what 
rights are fundamental.”30  Though I am not here considering the question of 
incorporation, the debate is relevant to uncovering the Court’s answer to the 
question of what kinds of rights are brought under the substantive due process 
clauses: the answer is those rights that are fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty. 
Relying on aspects of this debate, Justice Thomas was alone among recent 
justices in stating his view that the “Establishment Clause is a federalism 
provision, which for this reason, resists incorporation.”31  Under Justice 
Thomas’ view, if the Establishment Clause gives rise to a right against 
government establishment of religion, it is not a fundamental right because, by 
its language, it would seem to apply only against the federal government 
establishing religion, not against the state governments doing so.32 
Previously, the Court had decided Washington v. Glucksberg,33 a case 
concerning whether a state statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide 
offends the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 
holding that it does not, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s 
history, legal traditions, and practices.  In almost every State—indeed, in 
almost every western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide.  The States’ 
assisted-suicide bans are not innovations.  Rather, they are longstanding 
expressions of the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of all 
human life.  Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide—and, 
therefore, of assisting suicide—are consistent and enduring themes of our 
philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages.34 
What the Court seems to be suggesting here is that an indication of the status 
of a right is whether there has been a long standing and perhaps wide ranging 
 
 30. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 501–02 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
 31. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45–46 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 32. See id. 
 33. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997). 
 34. Id. at 710–11 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) 
(“[T]he States—indeed, all civilized nations—demonstrate their commitment to life by treating 
homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing 
criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide.”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (“[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus is . . . 
the pattern of enacted laws . . . .”)). 
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acceptance of the right, at least among Western democracies.35  Otherwise, it is 
not fundamental, even though it is recognized in some states, if other states are 
free to make laws that prohibit what the right protects and it is not generally 
recognized among Western democracies.  Of course, the question remains how 
to ascertain whether there is a long-standing and perhaps wide-ranging 
acceptance of the right.  Does one look to history, some widely understood 
view of what the right encompasses, perhaps by some form of conceptual 
analysis, or to still something else? 
The problem is that no specific criteria emerge from these cases for 
determining whether a right is fundamental or not.  This leaves recognition of 
particular unenumerated substantive due process rights open to various 
Justices’ interpretations—for example, Justice Scalia theorizing that they only 
exist if they are what the framers intended when they wrote this part of the 
Constitution.36  Or, from a different theoretical direction it would not be hard 
to imagine Justice Thomas impliedly asking—though he was only at the time 
talking about the Establishment Clause—if applying a certain right against the 
states would seriously offend other constitutional provisions.  And, of course, 
if one approaches the matter empirically, to ask whether there has there been a 
long-standing philosophical, legal, or cultural opposition against this right, 
then we would be at a loss to explain, from a judicial perspective, the Court’s 
current acceptance of a fundamental right to contraception, abortion, etc.  Of 
interest too is that these potential criteria should be empirical as opposed to 
being based on either some hierarchical moral system from which the right 
might derive, or even just some searching analysis of the concept of 
substantive due process. 
II.  THE DEBATE 
The current debate over what rights are found within (or fall under) 
substantive due process is amply reflected in a recent set of judicial opinions 
from Justices Scalia and Stevens,37 as well as in scholarly writings by Gordon 
S. Wood, Laurence H. Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin.38  For 
purposes of this discussion, I will be focusing primarily on the writings of 
Scalia and Dworkin. 
What does the Constitution mean and how is it to be interpreted?  In A 
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Justice Scalia writes: 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 45 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 37. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050–88 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Id. at 3088–120 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 38. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 36, at 47. 
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If the Courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they will, by God, write it 
the way the majority wants; the appointment and confirmation process will see 
to that.  This, of course, is the end of the Bill of Rights, whose meaning will be 
committed to the very body it was meant to protect against: the majority.  By 
trying to make the Constitution do everything that needs doing from age to 
age, we shall have caused it to do nothing at all.39 
Justice Scalia describes the current debate over interpretation not as centered 
on the question of 
Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but rather that between original 
meaning (whether derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.  
The ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of 
what is called The Living Constitution, a body of law that (unlike normal 
statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a 
changing society.  And it is the judges who determine those needs and “find” 
that changing law.40 
According to Justice Scalia, The Living Constitution school of thought 
incorporates “a common-law way of making law, and not the way of 
construing a democratically adopted text.”41  In Justice Scalia’s view, the 
Constitution is best understood not as living but as enduring.42  And it is the 
attempt to change from this understanding that is its primary problem. 
[I]f the people come to believe that the Constitution is not a text like other 
texts; that it means, not what it says or what it was understood to mean, but 
what it should mean, in light of the “evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of an enduring society”—well, then, they will look for 
qualifications other than impartiality, judgment, and lawyerly acumen in those 
who they select to interpret it.  More specifically, they will look for judges who 
agree with them as to what the evolving standards have evolved to; who agree 
with them as to what the Constitution ought to be.43 
 
 39. Id.  “Professor McBain of the Columbia University Law School published a book in 
1927 entitled The Living Constitution.  . . . The first meaning was expressed over a half-century 
ago by Mr. Justice Holmes . . . .”  William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 
TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976). The pragmatist view is that interpretation of the Constitution may 
change according to evolving social changes.  Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the 
Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1347–48 (1988). 
 40. SCALIA, supra note 36, at 38. 
 41. Id. at 40. 
 42. In First Things magazine, Justice Scalia wrote: “[T]he Constitution that I interpret and 
apply is not living but dead—or, as I prefer to put it, enduring.  It means today not what current 
society (much less the Court) thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant when it was adopted.”  
Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, 123 FIRST THINGS 17, 17 (2002), available at 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/gods-justice-and-ours-32. 
 43. SCALIA, supra note 36, at 46–47. 
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Justice Scalia wants in the name of democratic principle to essentially 
freeze constitutional language to only what it meant at its origination and was 
understood to encompass by those who wrote it.  In this way, he believes the 
Bill of Rights endures to protect rights—but only those rights—that would 
have been recognized at the time of its adoption.  Of course, this would mean 
that the right to marry someone of a different race could not be a fundamental 
right, notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia.44  Questions 
concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty, a woman’s right to 
choose whether to continue a pregnancy, the right to marry someone of the 
same sex, and to receive an education or health care would be resolved by 
appeal to the expectations at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.  
Similarly, whether limitations could alter previously understood rights to 
property and freedom of religion would also be based on the understandings of 
the Framers at the time of adoption.  I do not mean to suggest that Justice 
Scalia would not consider any cases since that time, but the gloss by which 
new rights would be discovered or old rights extended would be limited by the 
expectations of the Framers. 
Professor Ronald Dworkin challenges Justice Scalia’s view.  Dworkin 
notes an important distinction between two forms of interpretativism, both of 
which comport with original intent.  The first “‘semantic’ originalism . . . 
insists that the rights-granting clauses be read to say what those who made 
them intended to say, and [the second] ‘expectation’ originalism . . . holds that 
these clauses should be understood to have the consequences that those who 
made them expected them to have.”45  In other words, when looking at 
constitutional provisions, including those contained in the Bill of Rights, one 
notes that sometimes the original language is very concrete; other times, like 
with the words “cruel and unusual” in the Eighth Amendment, it is abstract.  
For instance, “the various provisions for criminal and civil process in the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments do not speak of ‘fair’, or ‘due’ 
[process] or ‘unusual’ procedures [as in the later part of the Fourth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments] but lay down very concrete provisions,” such as the 
requirement that a warrant be issued based on probable cause before there can 
be a search of “persons, houses, papers or effects.”46  Similarly, concrete 
language is used “for the same offense [not] to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb,”47 the guarantee of a “right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury,”48 to confront witnesses against oneself,49 to “compulsory 
 
 44. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 45. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 36, at 115, 119. 
 46. Id. at 121–22 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 49. Id. 
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process,”50 and the right to trial by jury in a civil matter “where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.”51  Dworkin believes the choice of 
language signals an intent by the Framers that some provisions should hold fast 
over time while others should be subject to the changing moral sentiments of 
the society.52 
Dworkin’s analysis brings us to the conclusion that “expectation 
originalism” is not a morally neutral view in constitutional interpretation, but a 
present desire to limit the rights founded, for example, under substantive due 
process to only those accepted at a much earlier time.53  This may have the 
benefit of guaranteeing previously accepted rights, but only at the cost of 
ignoring, what the Framers apparently did recognize, that the evolution of 
society’s understandings in certain areas ought to be given constitutional 
protection.54  Dworkin’s answer to Scalia’s concern that this would be the end 
of the Bill of Rights is: “History disagrees.  Justices whose methods seem 
closest to the moral reading of the Constitution have been champions, not 
enemies, of individual rights . . . .”55  Justice Scalia’s only response to 
Dworkin’s history argument is to assert: “Well, there is not really much history 
to go on,” probably “only forty years.”56  Moreover, he may very well disagree 
with those whose rights recent history has recognized57 as itself a limitation on 
those whose rights he believes ought to be recognized—perhaps the rights of 
the unborn58 or those whose religious beliefs are offended by seemingly neutral 
policies at, for example, public universities requiring all recognized groups, 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 52. Dworkin, supra note 45, at 122.  Dworkin notes that had the Framers “intended a dated 
provision, they could and would have written an explicit one.  Of course, we cannot imagine 
Madison or any of his contemporaries doing that: they wouldn’t think it appropriate to protect 
what they took to be a fundamental right in such terms.  But that surely means that the dated 
translation would be a plain mistranslation.”  Id. 
 53. See id. at 119. 
 54. See id. at 120–22. 
 55. Id. at 126–27. 
 56. Antonin Scalia, Response, in SCALIA, supra note 36, at 129, 149 (responding to 
Professor Dworkin’s history argument). 
 57. Such as women’s reproductive rights, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), aff’d in part by 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and the rights of adult gay persons to freely 
engage in same-sex, noncommercial sexual relationships in the home, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
 58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
that the Constitution makes no mention of a right to abortion nor would such a right have been 
recognized when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted). 
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including religious groups, to grant equal access to all students who want to 
join.59 
III.  EPISTEMIC AND LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE 
Philosophers draw two types of distinctions applicable to human 
understandings: the first is a conceptual/logical distinction concerning how the 
truth of a proposition is determined; the second is an epistemic distinction 
concerning how we go about justifying a proposition as true.  The first 
distinction separates propositions that are analytic from those that are 
synthetic.  The second separates how the truth of propositions is determined, 
either from empirical experience or outside of empirical experience. 
Analytic propositions are true by virtue of their meanings alone.  The 
principle of identity is what confirms them.60  The idea is often stated that the 
meaning of the predicate term is encompassed within the meaning of the 
subject term.61  An example of an analytic proposition is: “All squares are four 
equal sided figures.”  The proposition is true given our definition of a square.  
Synthetic propositions are not true by virtue of their meanings alone.62  The 
truth (or in this example falsity) of the statement “all two-legged creatures are 
mammals” cannot be determined from the meaning of its subject and predicate 
terms alone.  Outside information is required, namely, information from 
biology and zoology.63 
If the truth of a proposition is justified by an appeal to experience we say 
the justification is a posteriori.64  An example of an a posteriori proposition is: 
“The Willis Tower is the tallest building in Chicago.”  Empirically measuring 
the height of the Willis Tower and comparing that measurement to the height 
of other buildings in Chicago determines its truth.  In contrast, logical and 
mathematical propositions are not justified by experience.65  The justification 
of these propositions is outside of experience, in which case we say the 
justification is a priori.66  An example of an a priori proposition is: “Nothing 
can both be and not be in the same way at the same time.”  What justifies the 
truth of this proposition is that we cannot think it false. 
What is of interest to judgment in general is what happens when we cross 
the analytic-synthetic distinction with the a priori-a posteriori distinction.  
 
 59. Christian Legal Society v. Hastings, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3007–09 (2010) (Alito, J., 
dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, J.J.). 
 60. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 48 (Norman K. Smith trans., St. Martin’s 
Press unabr. ed. 1965) (1781). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 48–49. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 42–43. 
 65. Id. at 52. 
 66. KANT, supra note 60, at 52. 
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Immanuel Kant was the first to do this, while trying to resolve David Hume’s 
problem of trying to connect our many separate distinct experiences in 
personal identity.67  Kant recognized three interesting outcomes in crossing the 
logical distinction with the epistemic one.  Some propositions were analytic-a 
priori like “all bachelors are unmarried men” because the meaning of the 
predicate was contained in the subject and the truth of the proposition was thus 
determined without appeal to empirical experience.  Some others were 
synthetic-a posteriori.  For example, eventually science showed that “water is 
H2O.”  At least at the time water was first chemically analyzed, this would 
have been a synthetic-a posteriori proposition.  The predicate “is H2O” would 
not have been part of the original definition of water because until that time it 
would not have been known.  Through much of history and even today in 
many places, a parent might tell their child to go fetch some water without any 
understanding of its chemical nature.  The proposition, “water is H2O,” was 
justified by scientists’ discoveries in their laboratories while doing a chemical 
analysis.  So far, this seems pretty non-controversial. 
What Kant proposed was that certain propositions might be neither 
analytic-a priori nor synthetic-a posteriori but, instead, synthetic-a priori.  
Here, the predicate would not be contained in the subject; nevertheless its truth 
would be established outside of experience.68  Two examples Kant used were: 
“7 + 5 = 12” and “[t]he shortest distance between two points is a straight 
line.”69  In the former case, 12 is not contained in 7, 5, or our understanding of 
“+”.70  That is to say, if we were able to count only up to 10, we could 
understand the placement on the number line of 5 and 7.  We also could 
presumably understand “+”, at least insofar as we could add numbers whose 
sum was 10 or less, without suggesting that 12 be contained in our 
understanding of any of these prior terms.  In the latter case, the idea of a 
straight line is not contained in “the shortest distance between two points.”71  
On a sphere, the shortest distance would be a geodesic.  However, Kant 
 
 67. David Hume was an empiricist who believed all our knowledge of matters of fact arose 
from impressions.  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 4 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1740).  However, when Hume tried to account for the 
cause/effect relation, he had no impression of the force or necessary connection.  Id. at 77.  This 
led him to conjecture that the cause/effect relation was imposed on experience by habit of the 
mind.  Id. at 93.  However, when he then turned his attention to how the mind connects its many 
discrete impressions, he had no impression that would allow him to account for personal identity.  
Id. at 635–36.  In the Appendix to the Treatise on Human Nature, Hume confesses accounting for 
personal identity may be a problem for “[o]thers, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature 
reflection.”  Id. at 636. 
 68. KANT, supra note 60, at 52–53. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 53. 
 71. Id. 
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thought that no propositions would satisfy the analytic-a posteriori crossover, 
“[f]or, before appealing to experience, I have already in the concept . . . all the 
conditions required for my judgment.”72 
Because I believe Kant may be wrong on this last point, I will propose an 
analytic-a posteriori approach to further our understanding of judgments, 
without denying what may already be understood about the crossover of the 
logical and epistemic, or how it might apply to unraveling concerns of 
substantive due process.  I do not intend disagreement with the more synthetic-
a priori Kantian approach I have taken elsewhere;73 instead, I intend to show 
that a bottom-up (analytic-a posteriori) approach that meets at the same point 
as my earlier top-down (synthetic-a priori) approach provides even greater 
persuasive support for the validity of a rights claim capable of satisfying both 
positions. 
Before beginning that process, however, I should fully explain Kant’s 
understanding of the synthetic-a priori in respect to moral philosophy because 
it is relevant to the normative language of law.  The other approaches, such as 
the analytic-a priori or the synthetic-a posteriori, can also be used to identify 
the legal/normative meanings of already existing terms or to note what norms 
society currently attaches to an existing legal doctrine such as due process.  
But these approaches are inherently non-normative in that they merely 
describe existing understandings, even if some may be subtle and complex. 
Here, it is important to recognize that Kant took “the highest principles and 
fundamental concepts of morality” to be synthetic-a priori 
because, although they do not lay at the foundation of their precepts the 
concepts of pleasure and pain, of the desires and inclinations, etc., all of which 
are of empirical origin, yet in the construction of a system of pure morality 
these empirical concepts must necessarily be brought into the concept of duty, 
as representing either a hindrance, which we have to overcome, or an 
allurement, which must not be made into a motive.74 
That is to say these motives must be brought under the authority of the 
categorical imperative, as a pure concept of our reason, before they can 
become a basis for action.75  Although I do not intend to follow a synthetic-a 
 
 72. Id. at 49. 
 73. See Vincent J. Samar, Throwing Down the International Gauntlet: Same-Sex Marriage 
as a Human Right, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 27–39, 43–55 (2007) (arguing that a 
Gewirthian human rights approach would provide moral legitimacy for recognition of same sex-
marriages under international and domestic law). 
 74. KANT, supra note 60, at 61. 
 75. Here, the idea of the categorical imperative is a synthetic-a priori idea for it derives out 
of what we mean by a perfectly good will, which acts independent of desire or concern for 
particular outcomes but just because doing the act is right.  IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 9–10 (Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Merril Co. 1959) (1785).  
Still, the idea of a perfectly good will cannot be found in any analysis of the concepts of good or 
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priori approach in this article (I have done so elsewhere76), I point out its 
significance to ethics because discussions of substantive due process rights is 
often thought to presuppose—though not necessarily—rights that are part of an 
already existing, longstanding moral tradition, and all the aforementioned four 
approaches can be utilized to attempt an unraveling of such tradition.77 
As previously stated, Kant doubted the value of an analytic-a posteriori 
proposition.78  Kant’s concern was that before any appeal to experience would 
be made, all conditions for the judgment would have been satisfied by an 
analysis of the concept.79  In an article, Analytic A Posteriori Propositions, 
Professor Virgil C. Aldrich explains: 
Consider the proposition, ‘This is white’, where he who makes this statement 
holds up in full view and broad daylight, say, a white candle.  His companion 
sees what is being talked about.  Well, we agreed above that the subject of a 
proposition is that about which something is said.  In the case then of this 
bedrock sort of singular proposition, the subject is not a concept [to be 
analyzed] but something that both speaker and listener are looking at.  It is a 
precept.  Even if neither of them know that what they are looking at is a 
candle, which would be true if neither had heard about or experienced candles 
before, this would not prevent them from understanding perfectly the 
proposition, ‘This is white’.80 
 
will but merges to capture what it is that determines a situation to be morally right.  See id. at 13–
14, 16–18.  I often use two examples with students.  The first is of two friends playing when one 
reaches for a gun he believes to be a toy and ends up shooting his friend to death.  The other is of 
two people fighting when one reaches for a gun he believes to be real but because it is a toy only 
shoots water in the other’s face.  Almost instantly, everyone agrees that although the former has 
the graver consequence, it is the latter that is fundamentally wrongful.  And this is not found by 
an analysis of the concepts or situation as such but by how the concepts come together to prove us 
a notion of a good intention. 
 76. Samar, supra note 73. 
 77. Although Kant will later in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals try to establish 
how the imperative might be proved provided we can not disavow freedom of the will, earlier he 
notes that even if it cannot be proved, it is central to our idea of morality as something real.  See 
KANT, supra note 75, at 63–64.  As he puts it: 
How such a synthetical practical a priori proposition is possible and why it is necessary is 
a problem whose solution does not lie within the boundaries of the metaphysics of morals.  
Moreover, we have not here affirmed its truth, and even less professed to command a 
proof of it.  We showed only through the universally received concept of morals that 
autonomy of the will is unavoidably connected with it, or rather that it is its foundation.  
Whoever, therefore, holds morality to be something real and not a chimerical idea without 
truth must also concede its principle which has been adduced here. 
Id. 
 78. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 79. See KANT, supra note 60, at 49. 
 80. Virgil C. Aldrich, Analytic A Posteriori Propositions, 28 ANALYSIS 200, 200 (1968). 
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What Professor Aldrich is saying might perhaps be better understood if we 
think of how we come to identify a painting, photograph, or other image with a 
particular experience, perhaps some past memory or present sensation of a 
particular person, landscape, or thing.  Here, the experience provides the data 
that gives rise to our recognition in viewing the image.  Our recognition arises 
because the image contains elements in its depiction that correlate with the 
data of our experience.  Thus, the recognition is analytic but, at the same time, 
a posteriori because it derives from our experience.  It appears, at least for 
empirical propositions, analytic-a posteriori knowledge is possible.  However, 
it remains a question whether this could extend to necessary propositions;81 
although the recognition of the very process itself might constitute, at least, a 
necessary assertoric true proposition.82  I believe Professor Aldrich had this in 
mind when he goes on to say: 
In short, having a concept of the subject of such singular propositions is not 
necessary to their intelligibility or to their completeness, as long as their 
subjects are clearly in view—or as long as the communicants see that of which 
the predicate is predicated.  They would be incomplete for one who hears the 
statements and does not see what is being talked about, since in that 
circumstance they virtually have no subjects.83 
Some may question whether the mind itself, in its recognition of the truth of 
the proposition, plays an independent role such as making the proposition 
appear analytic.  I disagree because the mind also plays a perhaps similar role 
in the recognition of analytic-a priori propositions when it understands the 
meaning of the subject term. 
In similar fashion, one can envision many subjects, including life 
situations, in which the communicants can discern what is being predicated of 
the subject without specific conceptual analysis of the subject.  If that is the 
case, then perhaps many of our precepts of what life includes can be identified 
by how they correlate with the lived experiences we associate with them.  And 
if this is true, then perhaps our idea of what might make a right fundamental 
for substantive due process purposes also can be gleaned from how the object 
of the right is experienced by those most affected by it.84 
 
 81. I owe this critical point to my colleague Professor Victoria S. Wicki of the Loyola 
University Philosophy Department. 
 82. Moreover, most synthetic a posteriori propositions are not necessary.  That “water is 
H2O” or that “a body has weight, “ KANT, supra note 60, at 49, is certainly not necessary, but just 
happens to be the case in our world, and, in the latter instance, only when in the presence of a 
gravitational field in our world. 
 83. Aldrich, supra note 80, at 200. 
 84. I should point out that Professor Aldrich’s view is not without criticism.  In a paper by 
Donald F. Henze, Henze takes to task Aldrich’s claim that propositions of this sort are analytic 
rather than synthetic.  As Henze argues: 
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Herein lies how I see these four types of propositional judgments lining up 
to unravel various meanings to substantive due process.  The synthetic-a 
posteriori proposition fits the scheme of one who seeks to find in the nature of 
things a real connection, which is then assigned moral priority because it 
contributes to the natural order, the so-called Natural Law position.  Justice 
Clarence Thomas’ view of law, and specifically substantive due process, seems 
to follow this pathway, although perhaps at other times might seem a bit more 
Kantian.85 
 
I understand the crucial part of Aldrich’s argument to run as follows:  The subject of P 
[propositions of this sort] is not a concept but a ‘precept’, ‘something that both speaker 
and listener are looking at’.  P is about ‘its subject term, and this is the shown thing, not a 
verbal term appearing in the sentence and expressing a concept’.  The predicate however 
is ‘a verbal term “white”‘ and what it ‘perceptibly denotes’ is contained or included in the 
subject.  Thus P is analytic.  ‘But does this mean that it is necessarily true?  Certainly not 
in the sense that the candle has to be white.  But that it is white, there and then, is 
necessarily true, ex vi terminorum of “This is white” used in these circumstances. 
Donald F. Henze, Aldrich’s Monstrous Supposition, 29 ANALYSIS 137, 137 (1969). 
Henze wants to say that propositions of the P-type, whose subject is the word “this”, should 
not be construed as precepts versus propositions.  Id.  In this he seeks to limit Ludwig 
Wittengenstein’s statement that “‘[t]he demonstrative ‘this’ can never be without a bearer’” to be 
just a “grammatical (logical) fact.”  Id. (quoting LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 21 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958)).  I, however, believe Henze is 
being too shortsighted in claiming that “this is white” is true because “this” is used in these 
circumstances and would not necessarily be true in other circumstances.  As I try to show with 
my painting (image) example, I believe much if not all of human recognition operates in this way.  
In his reference to Wittgenstein, he ignores what Wittengenstein went on to say: 
It might be said: “so long as there is a this, the word ‘this’ has a meaning too, whether this 
is simple or complex.”—But that does not make the word into a name.  On the contrary: 
for a name is not used with, but only explained by means of, the gesture of pointing. 
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 84, at 21.  Wittgenstein suggests that there is no thing the “this” need 
refer to, but when it does refer to a thing, as when held up as Aldrich does when he says “this is 
white”, it has to be white for the statement to be true. 
 85. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Clarence Thomas, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 7, 
1991, at 41 (arguing that Justice Thomas’ writings, at least before joining the Court, indicate that 
he subscribes to a kind of Natural Law theory); see also Laurence Tribe, Clarence Thomas and 
“Natural Law,” N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991 at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/ 
07/15/opinion/clarence-thomas-and-natural-law.html.  In contrast, Stanley Fish took a more 
Kantian view of Justice Thomas when he noted on his New York Times Blog that: 
Thomas replies in his dissent that if racial preferences of the kind the law school employs 
will be illegal in 25 years, they are “illegal now,” for the Constitution, if it means 
anything, “means the same thing today as it will in 300 months.” For Thomas, what is at 
stake is the question of whether the Constitution has an unchanging meaning to which we 
are obliged to adhere, or whether, on the other hand, the Constitution is a dynamic, living 
document that adjusts to circumstances and the emergence of problems the founders never 
contemplated. 
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In contrast, the synthetic-a priori and analytic-a posteriori seems more 
related to a living constitution in which abstract language allows for moral 
growth, which in turn furthers our understanding of important constitutional 
provisions.86  Justice Stevens seems to have been more in this camp, although 
his often-pragmatic approach makes it unclear whether he is always starting 
from broad concepts of liberty and equality or sometimes from a narrower 
view of the implications of various decisions on different people’s lives.87 
 
Stanley Fish, Revisiting Affirmative Action, With Help from Kant, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION 
PAGES, Jan. 14, 2007, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/01/14/how-kant-might-view-
affirmative-action/. 
 86. See Dworkin, supra note 45, at 120. 
 87. William W. Fisher III, The development of modern American legal theory and the 
judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN 
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND LAW 1791 AND 1991, at 266, 361 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud 
Haakonssen eds., 1991).  William W. Fisher has noted that: 
[I]n his concurring opinion in Thornburg, Justice Stevens chastised Justice White for 
failing to recognize that a woman must have control over her own body [a form of 
autonomy] if she is to be free to define and pursue her ends in life: 
If Justice White were correct in regarding the postconception decision of the question 
whether to bear a child as a relatively unimportant, second-class sort of interest, I 
might agree with his view that the individual should be required to conform her 
decision to the will of the majority.  But if that decision commands the respect that is 
traditionally associated with the “sensitive areas of liberty” protected by the 
Constitution, . . . no individual should be compelled to surrender the freedom to make 
that decision for herself simply because her “value preferences” are not shared by the 
majority. 
Id. (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
777 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
But Fisher’s comments are not confined to any particular justice.  Later in that same piece, 
Fisher remarks that: 
In the eight years between the original decision in Griswold [v. Connecticut] and the 
explosive ruling in Roe [v. Wade], the focus of the Court’s concern gradually shifted from 
the protection of privacy in the traditional sense of “freedom from surveillance or 
disclosure of intimate affairs” to the protection of autonomy, that is, the right to make 
certain sorts of choices free from private or governmental interference.  In his opinion for 
the Court in Carey v. Population Services International, Justice Brennan explained the 
change in orientation as follows: 
Griswold did state that by “forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating 
their manufacture or sale,” the Connecticut statute . . . had “a maximum destructive 
impact” on privacy rights.  This intrusion into “the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms” made the statute particularly “repulsive.”  But subsequent decisions have 
made clear that the constitutional protection of individual autonomy in matters of 
childbearing is not dependent on that element.  Eisenstadt v. Baird[, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972)], holding that the protection is not limited to married couples, characterized the 
protected right as the “decision whether to bear or beget a child.”  Similarly, Roe v. 
Wade[, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)], held that the Constitution protects “a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.”  These decisions put Griswold in proper 
perspective.  Griswold may no longer be read as holding only that a State may not 
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The third approach, the analytic-a priori, fits the idea that the Constitution 
is a dead (or enduring) document whose meaning is discerned by strictly 
asking what expectation the Framers would have had for its various 
provisions.88  This is the view of Justice Scalia89 and exposes why historicism 
is so central to his analysis of constitutional texts.  The fourth approach, the 
analytic-a posteriori, is a view that I believe is held at times by Justice 
Kennedy and former Justices Stevens and O’Connor, insofar as they attempt to 
fit constitutional language to the real experiences of actual human beings.90  It 
is the approach that focuses on the lived experiences of real people and the way 
those experiences fundamentally affect them.91  It essentially is a 
phenomenological approach because it focuses on what our experiences teach 
us.92  My concern in also claiming it to also be analytically aposteriori is to 
undercut any possible criticism that such phenomenological approaches might 
arise from a misunderstanding of what is before us. 
As stated above, I am not seeking to question the synthetic-a priori 
approach, but rather suggest that approach is made even more persuasive when 
its outcome is consistent with the lived experiences of actual human beings in 
more than a synthetic way.  Indeed, the persuasiveness of this combined 
approach is illustrated from the analytic-a posteriori side in a recent district 
court opinion addressing the question of whether there is a substantive due 
process right to same-sex marriage.  In the next section, I will be presuming 
that one can derive from even a minimally robust notion of liberty a 
justification for same-sex marriage, so that the focus there can be on whether 
same-sex marriage might also be found from our experience of marriage today. 
IV.  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 
The constitutionality of bans on same-sex marriage provides an excellent 
opportunity to examine the interface of the synthetic-a priori with the analytic-
a posteriori.  Our understanding of marriage has so changed over the centuries 
that any attempt to limit it to a particular understanding from a particular 
time—the so-called “historicist position”—will be inadequate.93  The same 
problem does not arise for the synthetic-a priori, since there the questions are 
 
prohibit a married couple’s use of contraceptives.  Read in light of its progeny, the 
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters 
of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by State. 
Id. at 361–62 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 
678, 687 (1977)). 
 88. See SCALIA, supra note 36. 
 89. See SCALIA, supra note 36, at 47; Dworkin, supra note 44, at 119. 
 90. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626–27 (1996). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See SCALIA, supra note 36, at 36, 47. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
396 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:377 
not analytic; they are not limited to what marriage means nor to any set of 
empirical conditions that some may regularly associate with marriage, such as 
procreation and child rearing.94  To the contrary, the synthetic-a priori would 
search for an understanding of the conditions that make it possible for marriage 
to operate at all.95  So, I begin with the synthetic-a priori approach to see if 
what I subsequently find from the analytic-a posteriori approach reaches the 
same conclusion. 
Here, questions concerning the autonomy of the person, and the possibility 
that there could exist a capacity by which a person would be able to make 
choices that are mutually beneficial, all become particularly relevant.  The 
investigation of these questions would not limit itself to a mere analysis of the 
meaning of specific words like “marriage,” but would also take into account 
the real life conditions necessary to claim one is married.  Obviously, some of 
these are legal, but others are internal to the persons.96  They are the 
frameworks that make marriage valuable to them and why most would treat 
marriage to elicit moral significance regardless of the particular moralistic 
aspects often associated with religious teaching.  This moral significance 
encompasses Kant’s condition that maxims we set for ourselves be capable of 
being applied universally irrespective of any consequences to, or aspirations or 
sentiments of, the person.97 
But the moral significance of marriage is not limited to its ability to be a 
universal moral standard, for the moral significance of marriage, according to 
another moral theorist, Alan Gewirth, must also provide a material connection 
to human welfare or well-being.98  This proposition derives from the fact that 
 
 94. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 84. 
 95. See KANT, supra note 60, at 52–53. 
 96. See Vincent J. Samar, Privacy and Same-Sex Marriage: The Case for Treating Same-Sex 
Marriage as a Human Right, 68 MONT. L. REV. 335, 354 (2007). 
 97. In Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes: 
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it or in 
any principle of action which has to borrow its motive from this expected effect.  For all 
these effects (agreeableness of my own condition, indeed even the promotion of the 
happiness of others) could be brought about through other causes and would not require 
the will of a rational being, while the highest and unconditional good can be found only in 
such a will.  Therefore, the pre-eminent good can consist only in the conception of the law 
in itself (which can be present only in a rational being) so far as this conception and not 
the hoped-for effect is the determining ground of the will. 
KANT, supra note 75, at 20. 
 98. In Reason and Morality, Alan Gewirth states: 
Although agents often identify their well-being with their possessing certain particular 
goods, in such cases the well-being characterizes them not simply as agents but in some 
more restricted capacity.  It is also true that in some respects no sharp line can be drawn 
between the general capabilities and the particular goods because the former are exercised 
for the sake of the latter; and an agent who seldom or never achieved his particular 
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all human action is purposive.99  Thus, when an action is undertaken 
voluntarily, such as entering into a marriage, it must be understood to be done 
for some purpose that the agent takes to be good or has some positive regard 
for doing.  What transforms the agent’s particular purpose into a moral good is 
the Kantian requirement that it must at the same time be an action that all 
humans could engage without contradiction.100  This account is synthetic and 
not analytic because the purposes are not founded in any definition or image of 
the agent or his action, but in what motivates a person to act.  It is also a priori 
because the conditions that make the action moral are not based on there being 
empirical desires or motives of the moment, even if the desires or motives 
were universally held, but rather on the fact that all human beings could 
perform them without contradiction.101  Thus, the conditions are essential to 
humans being able to engage in voluntary purposive action, without which 
there would be no morality at all.102 
 
purposes would also probably not have the general capabilities for achieving them.  Well-
being in the inclusive sense is hence to be understood as a continuum that comprises 
having the general capabilities and successfully exercising them.  Since, however, agency 
is the condition of pursuing particular goods, the agent’s well-being is to be identified 
primarily even if not exclusively with the general abilities and conditions required for 
attaining any of his purposes.  It is these abilities that are necessary goods for the agent 
[qua agent], and they are states or dispositions of the agent himself as they impinge on his 
purposive pursuits.  Although the conditions of these pursuits may include circumstances 
that are distinct from the agent, such circumstances are for his well-being and hence are a 
part of his well-being. 
ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 60–61 (1978). 
 99. See id. at 39. 
 100. See KANT, supra note 75, at 47–48. 
 101. Were the conditions limited to just the empirical desires or motivations being present, 
the synthesis would be a posteriori, not a priori. 
 102. In laying the basis for what he will come to show as the relation between the generic 
features of action and human rights, Gewirth writes: 
In the broad senses in which each of them has been explicated here, voluntariness and 
purposiveness exhaust the generic features of action.  This can be seen by noting some of 
the ways in which they have been or may be distinguished, despite their close interrelation 
as concerned with reasons for acting.  Voluntariness involves a procedural aspect of 
actions in that it concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing events.  
Purposiveness, on the other hand, in addition to having the distinct procedural aspect 
mentioned above [of allowing the agent to make “an implicit value judgment about 
them”], also involves the substantive aspect of actions, the specific contents of these 
events.  Voluntariness refers to the means, purposiveness to the end; voluntariness 
comprises the agent’s causation of his action, whereas purposiveness comprises the object 
or goal of the action in the sense of the good he wants to achieve or have through his 
causation.  Thus voluntariness is a matter of initiation or control while purposiveness is at 
least in part a matter of consummation.  Other candidates for generic features of action, 
such as adherence to rules or principle, deliberation or calculation of the consequences, 
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So, from a synthetic-a priori moral perspective, the conditions for 
marriage are not based simply on the meaning of particular words or even 
depictions of specific events often associated with marriage, but on the role 
marriage plays in fulfilling the lives of those participating in it.103  In this 
sense, the right to marry satisfies the conditions for a moral right in the 
Kantian/Gewirthian sense because, as I have argued elsewhere, when full 
attention is paid to these conditions, they provide a kind of self-fulfillment that 
would otherwise be unobtainable.104  And in this respect, reason shows that 
same-sex couples stand no differently from opposite-sex couples with respect 
to the human right to marry a person of one’s own choice.105 
It is perhaps important to note how choice also operates to prevent 
marriage recognition from being assigned to certain kinds of relationships.106  
The parties to a marriage must be capable of acting voluntarily with knowledge 
of relevant circumstances.107  Accordingly, age is likely to be relevant insofar 
as it provides an index to establishing voluntariness.  Similarly, consanguinity 
may be relevant if the parties intend to have children or if an existing relation 
is too close to insure that the decision to marry was freely entered into.108  Our 
image of same-sex relationships can now be investigated both in terms of how 
the parties might see themselves as well as how others might see them. 
 
and so forth, either do not characterize all actions or else are derivative from and 
subsumable under one or the other of the two features discussed above. 
GEWIRTH, supra note 98, at 41. 
 103. The conditions that make moral action possible at all, such as voluntariness and 
purposiveness, are presupposed by morality; they are not, strictly speaking, merely a matter of its 
definition in which case they need have no effect on human action at all.  Id. at 53. 
 104. In another article, I describe the self-fulfillment that follows out of marriage this way: 
Marriage allows for the self-development of the moral virtues of justice, beneficence, 
temperance, and courage based on the excellence by which one participates intimately in 
the marital relationship.  Marriage is not just a collection of rights or a celebration of 
events, but rather a form of daily living encompassing the mundane and the extraordinary 
of the people whose bond it is.  Its contribution to human self-fulfillment thus sets it out 
as a unique practice among existing social institutions.  Marriage exhibits no difference 
when the institution is formed between persons of the same-sex as against persons of 
opposite-sex. 
Samar, supra note 73, at 33 (discussing how same-sex marriage affirms human dignity). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 31–32. 
 107. Id. at 21. 
 108. Obviously, these are important questions and would need to be explored more fully 
before they could be answered in any definitive way, but for purposes of this essay it is enough 
that they be acknowledged. 
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The moral approach I have just described essentially identifies a scheme 
for a top-down synthetic-a priori argument for a human right to marry.109  As I 
have provided a fuller account of this approach elsewhere, I will not provide 
more detail on that matter here.110  Instead, I will argue, as I suggest at the end 
of the preceding paragraph, for a bottom-up analytic-a posteriori argument that 
makes same-sex marriage part and parcel of our understanding of the lived 
experience of gay and lesbian couples today.  To do this, however, I will need 
to turn around the question from the previous paragraph.  Instead of asking 
whether faithfulness to human dignity requires interpreting the substantive due 
process clause to recognize same-sex marriage, I ask here instead: Do the lived 
experiences of same-sex couples not afford us an image of marriage as it has 
come to be recognized in the late 20th and early 21st centuries? 
To answer this question, I will not, in the first instance, be focusing on the 
concept of marriage, as that term has been traditionally defined.  Nor will I be 
attempting to derive a right to marry based on human dignity.  Instead, I will 
engage the real life experiences of persons who are engaged in relationships 
that appear to them as a marriage from their point of view.  Is this not what our 
current understanding of marriage is really about?  For those who think 
otherwise, I suggest they try viewing the image of marriage they hold from 
behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance concerning the parties’ sex, just to insure 
that their image is not constructed out of animus or bias.111  Under this 
constraint, I would suspect even those most opposed to same-sex marriage 
could conjure up an image of married (or soon-to-be married) persons—when 
the narrative presented focuses on the love the parties have for one another, as 
displayed by mutually supportive interactions—without providing any 
information about the parties’ sex.112  I further suspect that even the most 
ardent proponent of bans for same-sex marriage would find it difficult to 
 
 109. See Samar, supra note 73, at 27–39, 43–55 (arguing that a Gewirthian human rights 
approach would provide moral legitimacy for recognition of same sex-marriages under 
international and domestic law). 
 110. Id. 
 111. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls describes the function of the “veil of ignorance” in 
setting up a just society as follows: 
Among the essential features of [the original position] is that no one knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status, nor does any one [sic] know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.  I shall 
even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special 
psychological propensities.  The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of 
ignorance.  This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of 
principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.  
Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his 
particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1999). 
 112. Id. 
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differentiate same-sex from opposite-sex couples by any criterion other than 
gender.113 
Since the narrative provides the pathway to our vision of the relationship, it 
is important that I say something more specifically about what that narrative 
would likely contain.  A fortiori, since the narrative we construct for same-sex 
legal marriage will likely be more open than for traditional religious marriage, 
it is particularly important that we construct our picture relying on what the 
law envisions as a marriage since the law is not confined to any religious view.  
To assist in this effort, I will rely on the findings of fact from the federal 
district court for the Northern District of California in the recent case, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger.114  The court took pains, when writing its decision that bans 
on same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to establish a basis in evidence for its finding.115  As a prelude to 
this discussion, it should be understood that I am using the word “lived” to 
refer: 
[T]o the way that a person experiences and understands his or her world as real 
and meaningful.  Lived meanings describe those aspects of a situation as 
experienced by the person in it.  For example, a teacher wants to understand 
how a child meaningfully experiences or lives a certain situation even though 
the child is not explicitly aware of these lived meanings.116 
A. Background to the Case 
Following voter adoption of Proposition 22 in 2000, amending California’s 
Family Code to make marriage only between one man and one woman, the 
California Supreme Court ruled in 2008 that Proposition 22 violated the equal 
protection provision of the California constitution.117  Thereafter, a second 
voter initiative (“Proposition 8”) was adopted in November 2008, this time 
amending the California constitution, stating, “Only marriage between a man 
and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”118  Opponents of 
Proposition 8 challenged the initiative as violating the rules for amending the 
California constitution, along with other arguments.119  However, this time the 
Supreme Court of California upheld the initiative as to all new marriages, 
 
 113. Remember, at least with respect to legal marriage, the law does not require opposite-sex 
couples to promise to have children, and in several states same-sex couples do have children 
either by adoption, previous marriage, or surrogacy. 
 114. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 115. Id. at 953–73. 
 116. MAX VAN MANEN, RESEARCHING LIVED EXPERIENCE: HUMAN SCIENCE FOR AN 
ACTION SENSITIVE PEDAGOGY 183 (1990). 
 117. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927–28. 
 118. Id. at 927. 
 119. Id. 
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although the court allowed the 18,000 people, who had already gotten married, 
to remain married.120 
The case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger, which is a focus of this section, was 
then brought by two same-sex couples in federal court who wanted to get 
married but couldn’t, challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 under 
both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.121  The significance of this case for the 
purposes of this article is not just the holding in favor of the opponents of 
Proposition 8, but also Judge Walker’s careful elaboration of the impact this 
law was having on the social relations and human psychology of those 
prevented from marrying.122 
B. Legal Issues 
The elaboration of the impact of this law arose out of both opponents 
trying to show why Proposition 8 violated both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses, and the proponents trying to show that the law violated 
neither of these provisions.  In particular, the opponents of Proposition 8 
sought to show: 
1. It prevents each plaintiff from marrying the person of his or her choice; 
2. The choice of a marriage partner is sheltered by the Fourteenth 
Amendment from the state’s unwarranted usurpation of that choice; and 
3. California’s provision of a domestic partnership—a status giving same-sex 
couples the rights and responsibilities of marriage without providing 
marriage—does not afford plaintiffs an adequate substitute for marriage 
and, by disabling plaintiffs from marrying the person of their choice, 
invidiously discriminates, without justification, against plaintiffs and 
others who seek to marry a person of the same sex.123 
While proponents argued that Proposition 8: 
1. Maintains California’s definition of marriage as excluding same-sex 
couples; 
2. Affirms the will of California citizens to exclude same-sex couples from 
marriage; 
3. Promotes stability in relationships between a man and a woman because 
they naturally (and at times unintentionally) produce children; and 
 
 120. Id. at 928. 
 121. Id. at 927. 
 122. Id. at 991–1003. 
 123. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 929. 
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4. Promotes “statistically optimal” child-rearing households; that is, 
households in which children are raised by a man and a woman married to 
each other.124 
Based on the legal issues raised by the parties, the court identified the 
following three questions to guide its understanding and evaluation of the 
evidence presented: 
1. WHETHER ANY EVIDENCE SUPPORTS CALIFORNIA’S REFUSAL 
TO RECOGNIZE MARRIAGE BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE BECAUSE 
OF THEIR SEX; 
2. WHETHER ANY EVIDENCE SHOWS CALIFORNIA HAS AN 
INTEREST IN DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN SAME-SEX AND 
OPPOSITE-SEX UNIONS; and 
3. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SHOWS PROPOSITION 8 ENACTED A 
PRIVATE MORAL VIEW WITHOUT ADVANCING A LEGITIMATE 
GOVERNMENT INTEREST.125 
Because the evidence will implicate the lived experiences of many of 
California’s gay and lesbian couples, I will follow the court’s structure and 
take frequent quotes from the trial proceedings and summary of evidence in 
Judge Walker’s decision. 
C. The Evidence 
With regard to the question of “whether any evidence supports California’s 
refusal to recognize marriage between two people because of their sex,” the 
plaintiff Zarrillo testified that he wished “to marry Katami because marriage 
has a ‘special meaning’ that would alter their relationships with family and 
others.”126  Zarrillo described going to the bank with his partner to open a joint 
 
 124. Id. at 931.  The proponents actually toned down their assertions at trial from what the 
trial court recognized were their broader assertions to the public in getting Proposition 8 passed.  
Those earlier assertions stated: 
1. Denial of marriage to same-sex couples preserves marriage; 
2. Denial of marriage to same-sex couples allows gays and lesbians to live privately 
without requiring others, including (perhaps especially) children, to recognize or 
acknowledge the existence of same-sex couples; 
3. Denial of marriage to same-sex couples protects children; 
4. The ideal child-rearing environment requires one male parent and one female parent; 
5. Marriage is different in nature depending on the sex of the spouses, and an opposite-
sex couple’s marriage is superior to a same-sex couple’s marriage; and 
6. Same-sex couples’ marriages redefine opposite-sex couples’ marriages. 
Id. at 930. 
 125. Id. at 932 (capitalization in original). 
 126. Id. 
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account, and being asked, “Is it a business account?”127  Katami testified, 
“[M]arriage to Zarrillo would solidify their relationship and provide them the 
foundation they seek to raise a family together, explaining that for them, ‘the 
timeline has always been marriage first, before family.’”128 
Plaintiff Perry stated “that marriage would provide her what she wants 
most in life: a stable relationship with Stier, the woman she loves and with 
whom she has built a life and family.”129  As she put it, “I’m a 45-year-old 
woman.  I have been in love with a woman for 10 years and I don’t have a 
word to tell anybody about that.”130  Stier, in turn, said: 
[M]arrying Perry would make them feel included “in the social fabric.”  
Marriage would be a way to tell “our friends, our family, our society, our 
community, our parents . . . and each other that this is a lifetime 
commitment . . . we are not girlfriends.  We are not partners.  We are 
married.”131 
Historian Nancy Cott testified, “that marriage is ‘a couple’s choice to live 
with each other, to remain committed to one another, and to form a household 
based on their own feelings about one another, and their agreement to join in 
an economic partnership and support one another in terms of the material 
needs of life.’”132  On the proponents’ side, think tank founder David 
Blankenhorn stated: “[M]arriage is ‘a socially-approved sexual relationship 
between a man and a woman’ with a primary purpose to ‘regulate filiation.’”133  
Cott, who “explained that marriage encompasses a socially approved sexual 
union and an effective relationship and, for the state, forms the basis of stable 
households and private support obligations,” broadened that view.134 
The two experts disagreed over whether “historical changes in the 
institution of marriage” added to or deinstitutionalized marriage, with Cott 
emphasizing “removal of racial restrictions,” “elimination of coverture and 
other gender-based distinctions,” and Blankenhorn emphasizing “an increase in 
births outside of marriage and an increase in divorce rates.”135  But even 
Blankenhorn admitted “that marriage would benefit same-sex couples and their 
children, would reduce discrimination against gays and lesbians and would be 
 
 127. Id. at 933 (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1 at 84:8–12, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 528). 
 128. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 89:17–18). 
 129. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 933. 
 130. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 154:21–23). 
 131. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 175:22; 172:8–12). 
 132. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 127, at 201:9–14). 
 133. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 11 at 2742:9–10, 18, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 530). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 934. 
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‘a victory for the worthy ideas of tolerance and inclusion,’”136 although he 
continued to worry that same-sex marriage would weaken marriage.137  
Psychologist Letitia Anne Peplau stated: “[T]he desire of same-sex couples to 
marry illustrates the health of the institution of marriage and not, as 
Blankenhorn testified, the weakening of marriage.”138  That testimony was 
further collaborated by economist Lee Badgett who “provided evidence that 
same-sex couples would benefit economically if they were able to marry and 
that same-sex marriage would have no adverse effect on the institution of 
marriage or on opposite-sex couples.”139 
On the question of whether California has an interest in differentiating 
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, plaintiffs presented Psychologist 
Gregory Herek who described and defined sexual orientation as: 
[A]n enduring sexual, romantic, or intensely affectional attraction to men, to 
women, or to both men and women.  It’s also used to refer to an identity or a 
sense of self that is based on one’s enduring patterns of attraction.  And it’s 
also sometimes used to describe an enduring pattern of behavior.140 
Herek further testified “that homosexuality is a normal expression of human 
sexuality; the vast majority of gays and lesbians have little or no choice in their 
sexual orientation; and therapeutic efforts to change an individual’s sexual 
orientation have not been shown to be effective and instead pose a risk of harm 
to the individual.”141 
Although the proponents offered no testimony to contradict Herek, they 
did cross-examine him on whether “some individuals report fluidity in their 
sexual orientation.”142  Herek’s response was that the vast majority of people 
are consistent in their sexual orientation.143  Peplau also noted that “despite 
stereotypes suggesting gays and lesbians are unable to form stable 
relationships, same-sex couples are in fact indistinguishable from opposite-sex 
couples in terms of relationship quality and stability.”144  And social 
epidemiologist Ilan Meyer testified “that Proposition 8 stigmatizes gays and 
lesbians because it informs gays and lesbians that the State of California rejects 
their relationships as less valuable than opposite-sex relationships.”145  
 
 136. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 12 at 2850:12–13, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 531). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings Volume 9 at 2025:5–12, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), ECF No. 525). 
 141. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 934–35. 
 142. Id. at 935. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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According to Meyer, “Proposition 8 also provides state endorsement of private 
discrimination,” which “increases the likelihood of negative mental and 
physical health outcomes for gays and lesbians.”146 
With respect to children, the “[p]sychologist Michael Lamb testified that 
all available evidence shows that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are 
just as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents; 
and that the gender of a parent is immaterial to whether an adult is a good 
parent.”147  To proponent studies claiming that married couples provide an 
ideal child-rearing environment, Lamb responded that these studies compared 
not families headed by same-sex couples versus opposite-sex couples, but 
rather families headed by single parents or step-parents versus opposite-sex 
couples.148  The experts, Lamb and Blankenhorn, “disagreed on the importance 
of a biological link between parents and children.”149  However, as the court 
noted, “none of the studies Blankenhorn relied on isolates the genetic 
relationship between a parent and a child as a variable to be tested.”150 
A number of experts testified that both the State of California and its “gay 
and lesbian population suffer because domestic partnerships are not equivalent 
to marriage.”151  Badgett explained that because “gays and lesbians are less 
likely to enter domestic relationships than to marry,” fewer gays and lesbians 
have the protection of a state-recognized relationship.”152  Both she “and San 
Francisco economist Edmund Egan testified that states receive greater 
economic benefits from marriage than from domestic partnerships.”153 
Meyer testified that domestic partnerships actually stigmatize gays and 
lesbians even when enacted for the purpose of providing rights and benefits to 
same-sex couples.  Cott explained that domestic partnership cannot substitute 
for marriage because domestic partnerships do not have the same social and 
historical meaning as marriage and that much of the value of marriage comes 
from its social meaning.  Peplau testified that little of the cultural esteem 
surrounding marriage adheres to domestic partnerships.154 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 935. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id at 936. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 936. 
 154. Id.  Herek referenced a letter from the California Secretary of State to registered 
domestic partnerships that informed “them of upcoming changes to the law and [suggested] 
dissolution of their partnership to avoid any unwanted financial effects.”  Id. (citing Transcript of 
Proceedings Volume 9, supra note 140, at 2047:15–2048:5).  Herek pondered whether a similar 
letter would have been sent to married couples suggesting divorce.  Id. (citing Transcript of 
Proceedings Volume 9, supra note 140, at 2048:6–13). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
406 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:377 
This expert testimony was consistent with Stier’s testimony.155  Stier has a 
registered domestic partnership with Perry, but, as she explained, “there is 
certainly nothing about domestic partnership . . . that indicates the love and 
commitment that are inherent in marriage.”156 
As to the question whether the evidence shows Proposition 8 enacts a 
private moral view, the court noted that “[t]he testimony of several witnesses 
disclosed that a primary purpose of Proposition 8 was to ensure that California 
confer a policy preference for opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples 
based on a belief that same-sex pairings are immoral and should not be 
encouraged in California.”157 
The historian George Chauncey testified that “the Proposition 8 campaign 
emphasized the importance of protecting children and relied on stereotypical 
images of gays and lesbians.”  The “campaign did not need to explain what 
children were to be protected from; the advertisements relied on a cultural 
understanding that gays and lesbians are dangerous to children.  “Chauncey 
noted that stereotypes of gays and lesbians as predators or child molesters were 
reinforced in the mid-twentieth century and remain part of current public 
discourse.158 
On the effect of these moral views for political change, political scientist 
Gary Segura “testified that negative stereotypes about gays and lesbians inhibit 
political compromise with other groups,” and he “identified religion as the 
chief obstacle to gay and lesbian political advances.”159  However, “[p]olitical 
scientist Kenneth Miller disagreed with Segura’s conclusion . . . pointing to 
some successes [that gays and lesbians have made] on the state and national 
level.”160  That said, proponent Hak-Shing William Tam testified that he 
“operates the website ‘1man1woman.net’,”161 which “encouraged voters to 
support Proposition 8 on grounds that homosexuals are twelve times more 
likely to molest children,162 . . . and because [non-passage of] Proposition 8 
will cause states one-by-one to fall into Satan’s hands.”163 
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Explaining the effect of these campaigns on their well-being, plaintiff 
Katami stated that “he was angry and upset that children needed to be 
protected from him, . . . ‘it just demeans you.’”164  As the mother of four 
children, Steir felt: 
[T]he campaign messages were “used to sort of try to educate people or 
convince people that there was a great evil to be feared and that evil must be 
stopped and that evil is us, I guess.  . . . And the very notion that I could be part 
of what others need to protect their children from was just—it was more than 
upsetting.  It was sickening, truly.  I felt sickened by that campaign.165 
Economically, “Egan and Badgett testified that Proposition 8 harms the 
State of California and its local governments,” and “Egan explained that San 
Francisco lost and continues to lose money because Proposition 8 slashed the 
number of weddings performed in San Francisco.”166  The proponents 
challenged their testimony only as to “the magnitude and not the existence of 
the harms Egan identified.”167  Based on the testimony and other evidence 
presented, including the lack of credibility of proponents’ experts’ testimony, 
the court determined that “the evidence presented at trial fatally undermines 
the premises underlying proponents’ proffered rationales for Proposition 8.”168  
Furthermore, 
[t]he evidence demonstrated beyond serious reckoning that Proposition 8 finds 
support only in [conjecture, speculation, fears and moral] disapproval.  As 
such, Proposition 8 is beyond the constitutional reach of the voters or their 
representatives.169 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have sought to present a new direction for arguments 
concerning substantive due process rights.  In addition to the more familiar 
analytic-a priori, synthetic-a posteriori, and synthetic-a priori type arguments, 
I have sought to present an argument emphasizing the phenomenological lived 
experience of real people, which I designated an analytic-a posteriori 
argument.  I then sought to apply that argument to the recent same-sex 
marriage case rising from the Northern District of California to show how it 
might enlighten the findings of fact in that case and its significance for the 
lives of gay and lesbian couples generally. 
My point throughout has been to bolster the persuasive legitimacy of 
substantive due process rights claims when they can be founded on more than a 
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single methodological approach.  In the California case, I suggested that the 
decision reached by Judge Walker would be consistent with both a synthetic-a 
priori approach and an analytic-a posteriori approach.  As such, it should be 
held in high esteem because now two very different methodological 
approaches have essentially reached the same result. 
If I am correct in my suggestion of using a second approach to bolster a 
substantive due process rights decision in this particular case, perhaps the same 
methodology might be used more broadly to consider the persuasiveness of 
other claims that are likely to come before the Court.  At least at this point, this 
methodological approach would seem worthy of further investigation. 
 
